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Article 3

Surprised by Law
Emily Fowler Hartigan*
The AALS' convention this past month provided one of
those alleged rarities, a genuinely engaging panel discussion.
Surroundmg the key figure of Michael Sandel, Harvard
philosopher of community and the "encumbered self," were
several notable commentators. To my taste, the most
interesting exchange was between sandel, a passionate and
polished lecturer, and a ruddy, self-designatedly overweight
federal judge, Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit. Sandel,
wiry, intense, searingly concise, delivered his defense of an
ethics of appreciation which goes beyond mere toleration.
Consistent with his attacks on Kantian notions of the self,
Sandel argued for honor, not merely dignity, for persons.
Dignity focuses on the capacity to choose ends, while honor
attaches to the role, the behavior of persons in the world. I n
Sandel's scheme of "judgmental pluralism" we are to make
judgments about the moral worth of the practices which legal
rights are fashioned to protect. One key practice which Sandel
honors is that of those claimed in advance by a God Who sets a
Sabbath.
Reinhardt was nothing if not direct. He characterized
Sandel's stuff as the sort of academic theorizing which has
nothing much to do with the world, and which is just plain
wrong. Lapsing right back into the framework of American
philosophical liberalism, Reinhardt seemed to crash through
the network of finely outlined distinctions laid by Sandel. He
seemed a t first charming but clumsy, blunt, undeterred by
Sandel's analytical finesse. Yet in his apparent rampage, he
raised with almost unconscious elegance the main issue, and a
deeply troubling concrete dilemma.

* Adjunct Professor, University of Pe~sylvaniaLaw School. My gratitude and
love go to the community at Pendle Hill Quaker Study Center, where this first
germinated.
1. Association of American Law Schools.
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Reinhardt noted that Sandel's portrait of the person &d
not work because wTe are not free <mdwe are not determined,
but rather arc some mix. His statement of the common sense
situation of the person was tellingly set in the aegative-he
resisted saying we are free, because we are not ONLY free. In
one sense, this concedes much of Sandel's point about the
inadequacy of the Kantian, Rawlsian unencumbered rational
self, yet at the same time it reveals Sandel's fatal
incompleteness. And it focuses, for me, the issue of religious
freedom in a pcstmodern age.
To come at this freedom from another angle for a moment,
I want t o tell the story of Reinhardt's abstraction-resistent
example. The relationship between conscience and religion, and
the surrounding issues converge in a case Sandel introduced;
Reinhardt thought Sandel clearly wrong in his analysis. Sandel
took a position on Thorton v. Caulder, Inc.? the Connecticut
Sabbath case. I had thought I agreed with Sandel that the
Court should give deference to Sabbaths for days off. I agreed
with his critique of the atomistic, all-choosing individualistic
language of the Court. Reinhardt put his challenge this way:
How can we deny the equal rights of atheists who want to take
a day off when their children are at home? Suddenly, with the
power of one long-versed in the texture of actual court
controversies, Reinhardt had moved me, for reasons he did not
claim, t o knowing that he was, from my perspective, right.
Let me try to track his impact on my thought. There is
something radically important about people's relations with
their children. As I have a profoundly immanent notion of God,
I think that much of one's relationship to God is lived out in
loving one's children, honoring one's parents. I recall an
obviously substance-influenced young man in Madison
Wisconsin, one Fourth of July, backing off from a confrontation
with us older folk, invoking our youngsters, repeating like a
mantra t o himself and his friends: "Children are sacred." This
was from someone who loudly held nothing else sacred. His
chant restored civic order in the park, and gave me some sense
of the bases for respect which might carry us through a world
of fractured values.
Thus, to me Reinhardt's example raised an image of
something which may "claim" a parent every bit as much as

2.

472 U.S. 703 (1985).
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God claims most of us who believe. Such parental commitment
to children hardly portrays a "thinly constituted" person. I
want to honor the role of parent much a s that of faithful
believer, I suspect. If the verse in my tradition-that wherever
your treasure is, there will you find your heart3-is correct,
each of us has our God, located in that place we find our
hearts. On what basis would I differentiate profound parental
fidelity from a more theistic fidelity to a religious tradition? I
could try to do it facilely, by relying on the patent fact that the
Constitution was talking about theists when it enumerated the
right to free exercise, but Employment Division v. Smith4 and
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n5 are now
precedent, and they too are the law of the land. The very least
those cases have done is to face us directly into the nexus of
conscience and religion.
And Reinhardt's example leaves intact the dilemma about
freedom and determinism. Do we choose to have children, or is
that human phenomenon of the propagation of the species,
highly structured, fully constrained? Is having children a
matter of conscience? Is Sandel right to use the language of
"dictates of conscience"? Is non-religious conscience dictated? If
there is a dictating God, would that coercive discourse not also
apply to non-theists (I mean, if God is all-powerful, S/He's allpowerful whether we believe in Her or not)? If we are claimed
by God, then, and not free to choose our religious identity, are
not atheists part of God's plan? Are we not to learn to
appreciate the serpent, whom God made and set in the garden,
in my tradition? Which serpents are unacceptable? Sandel of
course cannot specify--he can only point, as he did at the end
of his talk, to Judge Frank Johnson and the march on Selma as
manifestly just. His final move of judgment, is itself bereft of
analytical elegance.
,
In fact, I think it returns us to Judge Reinhardt's homier
approach. Sandel liked John'son's judgment, but has no means
of distinguishing it from the immoral judgment of an immoral
judge, aside from disagreement over whether his or her cause
3.
Matthew 6:21.
494 US. 872 (1990) (holding that Free Exercise Clause is not violated when
4.
state proscribes the use of, and denies unemployment benefits to users of, peyote
for sacramental purposes).
485 US. 439 (1988) (holding that Free Exercise Clause does not preclude
5.
government from permitting road construction and timber harvesting in an area of
historical religious importance to Native Americans).
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is just. Reinhardt does not provide such means, either,
however. He claims neutrality, and that simply is inadequate
a t this point in intellectual history as a n account of why, as
Sandel responded after Reinhardt's remarks, Sandel would like
Reinhardt on the Supreme Court. Sandel liked Reinhardt's
politics, and so did I. Aside from Reinhardt's manifestation of
good humor and political compassion, however, Sandel learned
little from Reinhardt's propositional talk about why Sandel
found this thickly (in several ways) constituted self so winsome.
Neither Reinhardt nor Sandel talked about Who or what
claimed them, or the nature of this most central constituting
relationship. Sandel lauded Reinhardt's remarks, and called
Reinhardt to be more explicit in his moral judgments. I went
up afterwards and lauded Sandel and called him to be more
explicit in his theological judgments. Because what Sandel
values is that a person know Who has claimed him, yet he will
not talk to us about it directly. What he wants to appreciate,
make visible, foster and then judge in Reinhardt-his
morality-is SECONDARY yet Sandel hides his own more
fundamental, pre-social contract stance.
It is not that Sandel's politics might change, or his moral
appreciation were he to talk of his prior grounding-it is that
he is hiding his initial commitment in the dialogue. One
commentator a t the panel said Rawls' movement into the
original position was like a monk making such a decision-and
the simile is radically telling. It is precisely that Rawls engages
in the justice-seeking business to begin with, from an agenda,
which makes his book work6 . . . without that initial movement
of commitment to true dialogue, the book would never have
appeared, nor would his social contract seem plausible. And
Sandel's passion on the issue of being claimed is his motive
force, yet he does not open it to the discussion. Paul Ricoeur
argues that we who believe must willingly suspend such
commitment in order to enter the public discourse in respect
for those who are not of our beliefs, even the athei~t'-~et he,
too, fails to identify that first move as profoundly religious. It is
not that each should not engage in a new mixed discourse, but
that if they do so on these grounds, why would they not both
disclose and name the gift of that movement out of their first
6.
JOHN RAWLS,A THEORY OF JUSTICE(1971).
See PAUL RICOEUR,ONESELFAS ANOTHER 25 (Kathleen Blarney trans.,
7.
1992).
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language? And should they not say why they trust this
unknown ground on which they step to have dialogue with the
Other?
My concern is not to unveil Sandel-I believe such moves
must be made by the speaker, the writer himself-but to
identify what religious liberty means in a world of fluid
discourse. Our talk in public has been variously characterized
a s merging horizons, as an ongoing conversation, as the
constitution of communities of discourse, as making ourselves
in our talk, as constructing a social world and as being
constructed by a social world. What, in this dialogic
constitutionalism, does religious freedom mean?
Certainly it cannot be what the Court currently suggests,
or it is a n empty phrase. That is, something about exercise of
religion must be more than the freedom to think what one
wishes. In the traditional liberal worldview, as well as i n
Sandel's, that freedom cannot be extinguished. If what we want
is to know the phenomenology of the free-thinking slave,
Epictetus did a decent job of that many centuries ago.'
However, we purport to be about something more political,
something which directs or constrains governments. So what is
my freedom of religion? I want to suggest that it is a right
which I offer to make most explicitly into a gift. That is, I have
the right to exercise my religious beliefs, but I want to offer
something about that right to the public discourse, as a gesture
of respect. To make it correctly, however, I believe that I must
make it as a religious statement, and that to do less is to
diminish both myself and the communities with which I am i n
relation. The gift I want to make is one which enfolds the
person of conscience within that sacred Constitutional space
that tradition has kept for the religious person. I want to
honor, in my sense and in Sandel's, the person who feels
himself to be unclaimed by God, the person who knows no
relationship with God. But I want along the way the chance to
suggest why neither Sandel's Claimer nor the God whom
commentators like Iris Murdoch
can either support my
movement of gift, nor be God in a postmodern world.
Some of you may find the notion that this is a gift,
offensive. But see it fkom my perspective for a while. I am a
THE DISCOURSESOF EPICTETUS 304-05 (George Long trans., 1920).
See generally IRIS MURDOCH, METAPHYSICS AS A GUIDE TO MORALS:
PHILOSOPHICAL
REFLECTIONS(1992).
8.
9.
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theist. I experience a relationship with God, and I hope to
continue to grow in making it central to my life. The invitation
of this God is to love with my whole mind and heart and soul
and strength. There is no suggestion that I set Her aside for
any purpose, including political discourse. Yet S/He has created
a world in which good people do not know Her by any name
save the Good, and these are my brothers and sisters. I believe
that these persons are in God's image, and are part of a story
of Good News which at crucial times of belief such as Jesus'
eating the grilled fish after the Resurrection, includes the truth
of the verse: " . . . and some doubted."1° There He was, in
flesh and fish-and some doubted, as the Hebrew psalmwriters surely did. Like the serpent, these doubters, internal
and external, are part of God's creation. I want to honor these
doubters, but to do so I must first move from where I am, in
my own voice. If you as fellow-citizen want to claim for your
conscience what I am guaranteed in the Constitution for mine,
then listen to why I want to honor your claim.

Freedom has to do with the law of the unexpected. Holmes
says that law is about predictability, but part of what law is for
me is the Unknowable's way, and that is not our way-and yet
it is. The notion of law as unexpected seems ludicrous in the
light of law as order, as rule, as certainty. Yet I think of that
Other side of law, and believe that there is surprise, and unlike
the old nostrum that one should never ask on crossexamination a question without knowing the answer, this is
about risking such open-ended questioning.
It is the law we don't already know, which comes without
warning and reminds us that we are also free. I suggest that
this is @t. Let me tell you one of the stories of this, which will
tell you that this notion of unpredictable law as emergent gift
is not a cheap notion, for me.
I am divorced. My son, who is sixteen, lives now with his
father. This last year and a half, since Ben moved, has been
profoundly painful for me. I am not wise enough to know which
portion to relegate to the intrinsic move to separation for any
sixteen-year-old son, how much to the individual story. The

10.

Matthew 28:17.
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struggle for me has been to try to give my son all the room I
can, without guilt or anger (this is my aspiration . . . ). The
divorce decree stated that visitation with the non-residential
parent was to be paid for 50-50. I did that all the tough initial
years, as I drove to where we had all lived even when his
father did not want to see him because it was too painful to
reconnect and then let him go back with me. When we set up
his visit to me at Thanksgiving, and I talked to his father
about it, there was no issue in my mind; I had six visits ahead,
and his father owed me many, many trips.
When I checked about my son's Thanksgiving visit to
Pendle Hill, the Quaker study and contemplation center near
Philadelphia at which I am a resident this year, my son had to
tell me that his father suddenly had no intention of paying his
share. The court order remains unmodified. I called Ben's
father, upset that he seemed t o be reverting to the sort of
behavior one might understand closer to the rupture of actual
divorce, but I will tell you that as I first wrote this, I did not
know if I would see my son for the first time in three months,
or not.
I went back to my room, and then in distraction and
radical frustration, to the bathroom-locking my room door,
key inside. I had to rouse one of the women on the hall who
knew where the master key was out in the maintenance
building, at almost midnight. She trudged over, twice. I was
furious, rageful that the games of my son's father and my own
vulnerability led t o my subconscious's acting out and thus to
my friend's inconvenience. I said to her that what made me
angriest was that the impact of his actions was to lead her out
in the rain in mid-November Pennsylvania.
The next morning, she was at breakfast. My friend told me
a story I did not expect. On her trips to maintenance, she
realized as she passed the pottery studio, that she had left pots
drymg which if she did not trim would ossify beyond
redemption. Without my distress, she would have slept through
the crucial time, and lost all her pots. As it was, she went over
and rescued them all.
The notion of karma or dharma, of the way or the law of
fate, is a sense of the very innards of things, of the workings of
the threads of necessity and freedom which somehow transcend
time and are visible to oracles but not t o humans. This is a
sense of law which hints at determinism, at the idea that if we
just knew all the variables, we could predictithough we will
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never know them all. I think there is another notion of law
here, but one that can be both more creative and more
liberating than that darkly outlined in Greek tragedy a t first
reading-because the seeming dark is in fact the holy dark,
that without which we cannot be whole, and into which we
must pass in order to be given and achieve (both) that which
we most desire. We are constituted by the law, but we also
make it up as we go along. We discover it, and we ALSO create
it.
The unraveling and reraveling of this paradox sets the
context for the interplay between static and dynamic ideas of
natural law, and between positive and natural law notions. As
an intuitive model, I would suggest that the speculation about
genetics gives some hint about this interplay; in linguistic
terms, I liken it to conversation. True natural law is not a rigid
pre-determined set of rules in the face of which we are
ultimately passive, or even a movement towards a dictated
telos. There is, I suggest, a "law" of the cosmos that reflects
(with varying degrees of fidelity) into human legal edicts, that
is not imposed but is both given and improvised. Thus, original
ideas of DNA were relatively mechanical, constructing double
helixes which intertwined in beautifid but geometric systems,
with twenty-three chromosomes from each parent and an
infinite but somehow theoretically calculable set of
combinations. Time revealed those who surmised that genetic
mutations occurred during the lifetime, so that how we live
affects those basic building blocks, and thus we change our
very genetic legacy. "Nature" and "nurture" applied to
children's growth and also to our own bodies. Much was given;
much was made; both the given and the made were related to
one another fundamentally, in intricate daily steps.
Part of the given is known-and
from a different
perspective, it is also infinitely mysterious, unknown. Often, we
think of our lives as mostly predictable-we know who our
family members are, what our socio-economic status is,
whether we will be fat or thin in five years, what sort of work
we are likely to be doing, where we will probably live. Even if
these things are up for grabs, we find a sense of identity, of
what sort of person each of us is, or is becoming gradually,
relatively predictable. We think of law in much the same way.
There might be some changes, but by and large murder will be
prohibited, some sort of honesty in trade will be regulated
toward, some degree of regularity in administrative process will

SURPRISED BY LAW
be continually elaborated. Jay-walking will not become a
felony.
Some areas of law will be more open-ended. Toxic waste
will continue to battle with common law notions about
property, as Superfund legislation directed at environmental
emergency disrupts expectations. But surely we saw the
environment as the nascent area of crisis legislation many
years ago. We are surprised when disasters force us to focus,
but we are looking at something which we have known all
along a t some level. And the law is not so unrecognizable from
the imaginative perspective of those who stood a t Sinai, once
we impute to them a real appreciation of changes i n culture
and technology. The unexpectedness which I want to highlight
about law is something less about content and "progress"
naively viewed, than about the interplay between the law as
"laid down" by the Creator in the blueprint of the world, and
the law as the lived response of human freedom in that created
world. (My use of theistic language should not obscure the
correspondence between a world created and one in which one
key human enterprise has been to construct/discover the "laws"
of the universe from a secular-seeming perspective4 am
simply speaking in my first language to the reader, who may
process as she is most comfortable.) This is another face of the
polarity of freedom and fate, framed as a n inquiry into what we
do when we "obey the law."
The obedience to the law which I suggest is one which
turns away from the initial connotation which obedience
conveys now in the twilight of the patriarchy. It is not a
submission to the law of the father. It is more fundamentally a
listening. The etymology of "obedience" is "in the way of" (ob-)
hearing. The word derives from listening, from a stance of
attentive openness-not from slavish surrender of will or
internal coercion from childhood dictates. Obedience in this
guise taps not law's capacity to oblige, but to obligate; this is
not first the inexorability of law but primarily its song. There
may seem to be a n aspect of the siren song, the weird cantation
which compels what we would resist if we but could, a melodic
necessity which erases freedom. We all have internalized voices
of authority, inherited more than chosen. I suggest, however,
that such attention is a listening which is not unilateral i n
either direction-from
the father-god to the powerless
creatures, or from the wholly self-made ubermensch who have
survived the death of God, shouted defiantly into a universe
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either empty or constructed solely of our own imagination.
Rather, this listening comes in something that has the rhythm
of conversation. It is interactive, relational, always becoming,
never foreclosing something more, ever open to newness.
A crucial aspect of this sense of law is time. Time is needed
in which to tell and live stories, needed to re-member our
shared stories and new ones coming into being, and to find
words for the stories' rules. And crucial to time, I will suggest
along with many contemporary writers, is the practice of
writing. Thus, the law which I have argued is both written and
unwritten is always, in my story, moving toward writing. This
is not to conflate law with writing-rather the opposite-but to
suggest that it is in the very thing which we often think of as
giving law its greatest fxity, writing, which may best manifest
its unexpectedness.
In my tradition, this should be natural-seeming. After all,
the "good news" is both new and written. Surely, if Jesus was
the Son of God and Son of Man [sic], He had to know at some
level that this would get written down in scripture. In fact,
that is the very claim of John's "In the beginning was the
Word. . ."ll which echoes the bereshit of Genesis: "In the
beginning, God created . . . ."I2 Jesus was a Jew, coming into
and speaking from within and without, a profoundly written
tradition, one in which the world is worded into being and
written in the Book.
What is, I think, most unexpected, is that we do not only
listen in obedience, in this conversation of the law. We also
speak and write. Roberto Unger's classic Knowledge & Politics
ends with "Speak, God."13 What our traditions say is that God
has been speaking in creation-and humankind is integral to
that creation-all along. Yet the speech of God alone would not
be sufficient. Fate is not mechanical-it is Oedipus' and his
parents' responses which complete the story. Life cannot be a
one-sided conversation or ventriloquism. We must speak and
write our parts. Our speech needs always to attend to
silence-and when it comes, it must never leave behind the
silence from which it comes. Yet, finally, we are called upon to
answer.

11.
12.
13.

John 1:l.
Genesis 1:l.
ROBERTO M. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE& POLITICS 295 (1975).
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In C.S. Lewis's Till We Have Faced4 one of the most
striking things about the woman protagonist's journey is that
after she has written her complaint, the response is that
finally, what the heavens have awaited has come-a woman
has come with complaint. It is not men who concocted the
patriarchy-it arose out of the human condition which God
created. Now it is time to complain and to praise. It is time t o
tell the stories Elie Wiesel says God created us to hear (and the
jokes, I interject). It is time for the law to be spoken as well as
heard, to be created in conversation which acknowledges "that
beyond words" yet dares to speak into and from shared silence.
That is why, even though I know that the Civil Rights Act
of 196415included discrimination against anyone based on sex
because it was a JOKE interjected by a Southern
congressperson who thought such an addition would scuttle the
bill, I know that the law can live jokes well, and serve as well
as oppress. When we hear stories such as that in The
Brethren,16 which tell of Roe v. Wade's1' getting "on the
agenda" in a swap for putting on the baseball free agents' case,
we should hazard the laugh which such double irony invites.
The hidden jokes, the story in perspective, can be stunning.
But let me tell you what scares me about this unexpected,
unpredictable power of law most of all. It is a fear so elemental
that it predates civil law, moves across cultures, lives in
humankind's hidden recesses. It is called various things, but
most commonly the law of return.
I remember my client who was a member of Wicca, and of
the Covenant of the Goddess, a benign pagan nature religion.
Her children were taken from her because of the fear of the
social workers; finally even the Native American shaman's son
laid a hawk feather on her doorstep and went back t o tell his
office mates she was a Satan worshiper. They put her children
in fundamentalist Christian homes. She kept telling me about
the law of return: what goes around, comes around. She
crossed paths with another client, who eventually went t o trial.
The second client had been selected when she was sixteen for

14.
C.S. LEWIS,TILLWE HAVE FACES:A MYTHRETOLD (1956).
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-17
15.
(1988)).
BOBWOODWARD
& &XYIT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN:
INSIDE THE SUPREME
16.
COURT (1979).
17.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the attentions of the president of the Junior Chamber of
Commerce, then thirty-four with three children and wife. After
he waited until two days after her statutory rape birthday to
seduce her, he took graphic pictures of her on site at his
business, a pizza chain. They had a child. He moved on to
another woman after using my client's short-lived but
spectacular physical beauty. When the stories came out in the
papers, the case was wild and notorious, and my Wicca client
saw the understory right away. 'What goes around, comes
around," she said, especially as she learned how the judge
threw out our pleadings on the most outrageous pretexts; our
main cause of action, negligent infliction of emotional harm, he
deemed excluded because HIS NOTES of the pretrial
conference did not detail it, although the pleadings did. The
judge was weary, sodden, manipulable by the bullying male
attorneys who overtly approached him ex parte and bragged of
it. He ruled with complete abandon, complete lack of precedent
or law. We went to the jury without the main evidence (the
pictures), the crucial law (the multiple criminal statutes the
defendant had breached), and the cause of action on which we
had a prayer. "What goes around. . . " our older, more
seasoned client intoned.
The day after the two-week trial ended, the judge went on
a bike trip. He skidded down a hill and spent six weeks in
intensive care from which no one expected him to emerge. He
lived, but never presided over another day of court.
I am frightened of the power of that punitive-seeming law
of return. It threatens. It seems to say that the dictum that "by
the same measure with which you give out, you will re~eive,"'~
is a rigid reflection of your soul. All you have been given, for
good or ill, is of your own making. You are what you have done.
It makes no sense at a distance: Somali children cannot
have given out the measure of starvation. Victims have not
done what is done to them. All is not deserved. But there is
that insinuation, that suggestion that law is in fact something
which levels as a bomb levels, annihilates, punishes. This is
the accusation which Job resisted, and which the story of
Jesus-executed as a criminal-says is a lie. Yet what is this
law of return, and what is the nature of things, the law of
human good and evil?

18.

Matthew 7:2.
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My suggestion is this: It is a law in the making. It is not
ended with Josef K. in Kafka's The rial'^; law is not only the
faceless bureaucratic charge of our ubiquitous guilt. More than
that (for law is that harshness, also), true law is open. It is the
answer which Josef makes through Franz, who writes of it.
Franz Kafka's writing about writing is compelling, telling of
writing to live, of writing as life, for him. He writes of a world
in which Josef is trapped under law-but the author and the
reader are not trapped. The author and reader are in
conversation, and they do not accept the law as The Trial
portrays it. Kafka enacts the law as inexorable, tells its dark
secret, and thus renders it unacceptable. He frees himself i n
telling the reader, and the reader in reading the text accepts
this urge beyond condemnation. Our participation in his text,
our rejection of anonymous guilt, moves the law through and
beyond what modern bureaucratic numbing has let it become.
Kafka writes the story of unredeemed law, he writes himself
free, and we may respond with him, in redemptive insistence
on something more.
If law is not solely inexorable, what is it? I suggest that it
is always moving toward newness. Perhaps it does not move at
the pace many of us would want, but that joke in the Congress
almost thirty years ago made it the law that women and people
of color and believers could not be treated as they had been
without legal consequences. That is not a vacuous moment in
history, that joke. At times it has relapsed into empty promise,
but a t times it has told law firms that partnership decisions
are under the law, and even the hugest of the legal
establishment's bastions must navigate the waters of the Civil
Rights Act. Sometimes such laws touch hearts. Sometimes they
even touch minds. Sometimes they finally convince detractors
that it's just plain easier in the end to take the laws seriously
than to engage in elaborate pretexts, as Aristotle said that to
lie took a smarter person than he was.
And so it is that we do not only listen for the law. We also
try to speak it. That is sometimes what I find most
unexpected-or, rather, not that we speak, but that somehow
after that audacity, God, the Other, listens.
What comes of this listening God? This is the retelling of
the story which transforms fate. Suppose we are fated to marry
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our mothers or fathers, and kill the other parent? Suppose that
Freud has simply made more subtle what Oedipus lived and
Sophocles recorded? If there is to law that which is given, not
to be changed in itself, may the given not change by how it is
lived, by the texture of the story? One aspect of this freedom
from fate is in Oedipus' story? the oracle says that the city
which is home to Oedipus when he dies will fare well. That city
might have been Thebes, need not have been Argos. The
oracle's story includes freedom within it. When Dylan Thomas
says that "time held me green and dying, and I sang in my
chains like the sea" it is the song which counts, and the singing
transforms the very chains.
A different aspect of freedom's dance with fate, with law as
given, is that suggested to me by Juliana of Norwich's full
meditation, usually quoted only partially: Sin is necessary, but
all shall be well, and all shall be well, and all manner of thing
shall be well.21 The fact of t h fated transgressions is not a22
the story. The law of the oracle, of our legacies, of what the
Creator has made, is not all there is. We are also authors, cocreators, law-crafters, story-tellers. And we are not alone, just
the individual with God the Father. God is more mysterious
than that, and we are more multiple, more connected, more in
flux together. It is given that we must die, but what we do with
that law is all of a life full of the unexpected.
My suspicion-and as it is one of life's true mysteries, that
is all it can be: a suspicion, like one of Socrates' myths
punctuating his "rational" dialogues a t points which will
sustain no more such "reason7'-is that the reason for the
unexpected is that God gave us law to make us free. Law is the
last outpost before the abyss, and the first oasis beyond it, but
the leap through the void is where love truly grows real.
Catharine MacKinnon has portrayed the effects of power,
dominance, on what we call love. When there is a n imbalance
of coercive power, then love is never fully free. God the Father
cannot feel very well-cherished by adults, so long as the law is
punitive and inexorable. But set us free, loose those chains so
that we can if we choose say yes or no to true relationship with
One made equal by neediness like our own, and our yes is love

20.
SOPHOCLES,
OEDIPUS THE KING (Peter D. Arnott trans., Hilan Davidson
1960).
See JULIANOF NORWICH:
SHOWINGS
225 (Edmund Colledge & James Walsh
21.
trans., 1978).
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given freely to the Other. If there is a law of love, it cannot
command, nor is it a matter of obedience to the Father or the
state. We have grown so used to a law of calculation and
retribution and raw obedience, however, that a law of love and
conversation still comes as radically unexpected.

Now, in the back of my mind, ranging about like one of
Patricia Williams' polar bears just out of inner sight, is Judge
Reinhardt. If he found Sandel out to lunch, what would he
make of this patently spiritual stuff? I suspect that at this
juncture in the history of American culture, it would depend if
the conversation were considered "public" or "private." In socalled "public" discourse, the penchants of the judge are
irrelevant, according to his version of neutrality. But in
"private," I suspect that he might well be like the judge for
whom I clerked when I finished law school. My judge would
talk of his final grounding from time to time, in his soft, even
voice, especially a t the dinner the former clerks give him every
year. It wasn't so much denominational-he did not refer to the
Presbyterian church which had since reinstated him on its
board of elders after kicking him off as he desegregated the
schools in the late sixties-as it was Biblical. I t would be the
kind of quiet statement of fidelity to God's love and justice
which only a full evening of table fellowship could truly
sustain. It was in a gathering of friends, a time of communion
and rememberance. Direct references to God were circumspect
and often wry in his opinions, and rare. Yet his fidelity was
clear and consistent, even when twelve years after the
controversial bussing orders, his windshield was shattered the
night a movie about bussing was on national TV. My judge
lived and worked in a very real world, one in which his
children were threatened for his actions, his f i e n d s turned
their backs literally, and he endured threats of what Julius
Chambers, the plaintiffs' attorney underwent-fuebombingfor actions Sandel would find as courageous and just as Frank
john son'^.^^ And he knew that the only way to live the
courage which law required was in the freedom of God's love.
The gift which I propose in theory, one of expanding what the

22.

See supra p. 149 (referring to Frank Johnson).
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Constitution makes sacred for religion into the realm of
"secular" conscience so that what we know as religious liberty
a t its best will belong to us all, is one I saw him extend in his
courtroom to atheists, Muslims, prisoners, social security
disability aspirants, ingrates and illiterates. What he extended
was more than basic human respect, more than a formal
constitutional right, and no less than holding the difficult
balance of the individual and corporate conscience when in
tension with the demands of the state. He did it because we are
all God's creatures. Someday I'd like to have a conversation
with Reinhardt about that, and Sandel, and call them both to
tell their stories as part of fuller accounts of making judgments
i n law.
However, they are not here, and you are. So I call on you
to lift the corner of the self-censoring which brackets the
spiritual in your scholarship, scholarship which is often
passionately motivated by things which touch on the numinous.
As Sandel wants the community's discourse to be enriched by
the moral, I want it liberated by the spirit. For some of you,
this might involve lapsing into talk which is not so fluent for
you as your academic language. For some, it may seem
hopelessly private or inchoate. Those who find themselves to be
"hopeful agnostics" for example, may wonder what of value is
to be said. I can't know, but I do believe, that what is to be said
can be diflicult, whole, risky, wonderful, liberating and most
unexpected. I believe that such talk in all its plurality and
ambiguity, even if halting a t first, will not only set the speaker
free, but also make true religious liberty more likely in its
institutional and its community identities.

